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First half of 1977 
The 'futures' 
debate in the 
United Nations 
Philippe de Seynes* 
In recent years the future of mankind has 
become the object of intense and lively 
controversy which has led to the con-
struction of a number of 'scenarios of the 
unacceptable' and the proposition of 
various strategies for avoiding them. Of 
all the reports produced, Limits to 
Growth has had the widest circulation, 
notably contributing to the consolidation 
of the 'futures movement' by its dramatic 
emphasis on the perils threatening the 
'carrying capacity of the planet'. But the 
United Nations too has had different 
scenarios and strategies of its own, which 
it has put forward in such resolutions as 
those on the International Development 
Strategy and the New International 
Economic Order, directed towards the 
creation of a better society. 
Necessary though it is, the attempt 
to link up these various approaches has 
been hindered by the lack of an 
integrative theory to fill the gap left by 
the erosion of the major paradigms —the 
theory of general competitive equilibrium 
and the marxist view- which had been 
used for many decades to guide national 
development processes and international 
relations. The author maintains that a 
new scheme of global rationality could be 
constructed only on the basis of a 
'voluntarist' approach reconciling the 
objectives that stem from moral and 
political values with the realism of 
empirical analysis and the necessity of an 
international consensus. 
*Director, Special Project on the Future, 
United Nations Institute for Training and 
Research (UNITAR). 
Introduction 
The 1970s may be remembered as the 
time when the 'Future' , invaded the 
public debate and began to find its place 
in the cogitations of the techno-
structures. Think tanks and specialized 
periodicals dedicated to thinking about 
the future, as well as long-term model-
building and other similar products of 
the age of the computer, can now be said 
to be part of our institutional system. 
The impact and the real meaning of this 
'Futures Movement' are not as yet very 
clear. It is a proteiform phenomenon, 
often highly emotional, responding to 
strong and deep impulses as well as to 
rapidly changing fashions. But certain 
recognizable characteristics and trends 
are emerging, and may help in assessing, 
provisionally at least, a cultural force 
which does not appear to be a passing 
fad, but rather shows signs of spreading, 
and of assuming an encyclopedic 
dimension. 
/. The scope and nature of the debate 
Thinking about the Future is closely 
related to a new sense of 'globality' and 
world interdependence. These notions, 
whatever their emotional appeal and 
visionary message, are as yet far from 
heralding a 'manifest destiny' or delinea-
ting a clear path. Rather they must be 
seen as ambivalent and often divisive. 
The assertion of national identity is, for 
two-thirds of the world's peoples, experi-
enced as the driving and mobilizing force 
in the difficult task of social and 
political integration. And whereas in the 
older nations nationalism may at 
times be seen as a crispation, a retarding 
factor in the progress toward a higher 
level of consciousness, it is also an 
expression of the problems increasingly 
encountered in the management of the 
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social order, even in the smaller units of 
organized community life. Whether it is 
regarded as a promise, a challenge, or a 
nuisance, world interdependence cannot 
be interpreted in a static context. It is an 
aspect of the process of transformation. 
As such it is and will continue to be 
either encouraged or resisted. Its course 
is not at this stage ordained by a 
unifying aspiration, but determined by 
the interplay of contrasting attitudes and 
often conflicting interests. The 'Futures 
Movement* would lose much of its rele-
vance to the study of international rela-
tions and the promotion of a New World 
Order, if it failed to recognize at the 
outset a context of deep-seated tensions 
between the requirements of nationhood 
and the compelling vision of 'One 
World'. 
This reminder of the obvious is 
necessary because the present 'Futures 
Movement* seems to have acquired its 
remarkable momentum from a very 
different dialectical approach to the 
'problématique of mankind'. Although 
the sociological analysis of its origin and 
evolution remains to be made, there can 
be little doubt that it would not have 
emerged so forcefully, nor spread so 
rapidly within the dominant culture, 
were it not for the projected threats to 
the destiny of the human species. 
Scholars and officials had for some time 
been alert to the quickening pace of 
change and the novel characteristics of 
its manifestations. They were, however, 
mostly confident in the prevailing model 
of society and its adaptability to new 
circumstances, and in any case too 
absorbed in the complexities of control-
ling the short-term cycle to indulge more 
than episodically in interrogations about 
the longer term. Wherever agencies for 
central planning existed, they occasion-
ally lengthened their time horizon, but 
usually not beyond a span of 15 to 20 
years, and without seriously questioning 
the basic premises on which current 
trends had evolved. 
Individuals and private organizations, 
however, not hamstrung by the same 
constraints or prejudices, were bolder. 
While some hypothesized the almost 
uninhibited extension of current trends 
-judged to be largely beneficial- others 
began to highlight some of the more 
gloomy aspects of the human predica-
ment. They focussed, in particular, on 
the 'integrity of the environment', a 
notion somewhat new to western civili-
zations, presented at times as a con-
straint, too long disregarded, on develop-
ment, but often also, and more ambi-
tiously, as a concept providing a compre-
hensive framework within which 
previous findings of the social and 
economic disciplines would have to be 
re-examined and reformulated. The 
'ecological' school of thought burgeoned 
in the early sixties. Backed by a body of 
serious academic work, it warned of a 
global threat to the 'carrying capacity of 
the planet'. Over and above its impact in 
stimulating anti-pollution measures, it 
served to focalize and epitomize the 
widespread malaise, the sense of aliena-
tion which gripped the dominant culture 
in the last years of the decade, paradoxi-
cally coming into the open towards the 
end of the most extraordinary quarter-
century of expansion, innovation and 
confidence which history has recorded. 
Suddenly some of the singularities of 
that period, the price paid in terms of 
inj u st ices, unbalanced development, 
wastage and vulgarity of consumption 
habits, seemed to loom larger than the 
unprecedented successes. 
It was this loss of confidence, these 
disbeliefs and anxieties, rather than the 
optimistic extrapolations produced by 
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such well-established centres of long-
term studies as the Hudson Institute, 
that captured public imagination, nour-
ished the incipient 'Futures Movement' 
and gave it its original bias in the direc-
tion of the ecological school. 
The Club of Rome, a private body of 
concerned citizens, had the flair to 
recognize this mood, and to produce in 
1973 a 'scenario of the unacceptable' 
which had an extraordinary impact: an 
impact which, on the eve of the 500th 
anniversary of Copernicus' birth, could 
be viewed as setting in motion —at least 
within the dominant culture— a revolu-
tion in mental processes comparable to 
that historically associated with the 
work of the Polish astronomer. 
Limits to Growth* was a worldwide 
event. Its message immediately took root 
in the well-prepared ground of a number 
of constituencies, in addition to the 
ecological movement. There is always an 
ambiguity, a subtle interplay, in any 
thinking about the 'Future', between the 
prescription and the prediction. Many 
were quite ready, on the basis of their 
value system and in the context of their 
particular type of alienation, to take the 
prescription regardless of the validity 
of the prediction: radicals of different 
obediences, discovering yet another 
proof that 'the system cannot work'; 
exponents of a 'population explosion', 
frequently interpreted in simple mecha-
nistic terms; nostalgiacs of nature and 
the frugal life; moralists rejecting the 
'Faustian pact* of man with know-
ledge and expecting retribution. These 
sectarian groups were themselves direct 
—even if dissident— products of the 
dominant culture in the industrial world. 
'Dennis L. and Donella H. Meadows, 
Limits to Growth, Report to the Club of Rome, 
M.i.T., Cambridge, Mass., 1972. 
But the impact of Limits to Growth did 
not remain confined to them. It has 
widened, deepened and endured, despite 
the increasing controversy and critical 
analysis surrounding most of its findings. 
The scholarly critique of the method-
ology has not diminished the relevancy 
of the questions so dramatically pro-
jected. 
Two concomitant events seemed to 
validate, for a while at least, the basic 
thesis of Limits to Growth: droughts of 
unprecedented proportions covered for 
several consecutive years vast areas of 
the world around a large geographic 
arch, and in the winter of 1973, 
petroleum-exporting countries launched 
a new oil price strategy which could be 
seen as a 'discontinuity' in world 
economic trends. Both these events 
could be interpreted without recourse to 
the concept of 'finiteness': one was 
linked to clim atic vagaries as yet 
ill-explained, while the other expressed a 
broad political design made possible by a 
newly-perceived market power. The 
somewhat hasty generalizations that 
related them to the 'carrying capacity of 
the planet' did at least testify to the 
degree of influence achieved over a short 
period by a school of thought of which 
Limits to Growth was the most con-
spicuous product. Statesmen and politi-
cians soon recognized, if not a 'writing 
on the wall', at least the signal that some 
part of their conventional wisdom was 
being effectively challenged. 
They were, however, chiefly embar-
rassed, and, so to say, caught off 
balance, inasmuch as the message did not 
clearjiy exhibit the ideologies of the Left 
or the Right, but rather seemed to cut 
across traditional party alignments. It 
suggested the possibility of a new and 
imperfectly understood political polari-
zation at a time when ideological 
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frontiers were often becoming blurred 
and when positions on a number of 
problems made official party labels 
appear somewhat irrelevant. These ambi-
valent reactions to a new concept 
are evidenced in numerous public 
opinion polls. They were interestingly 
illustrated in 1973, during a public 
debate between Mr. Marchais, the Head 
of the French Communist Party, and 
Mr. Mansholt, at that time President of 
the Commission of the European 
Economic Community. The occasion 
was the referendum campaign in France 
for the admission of Great Britain to 
the Community. Mr. Marchais used a 
memorandum of Mr. Mansholt, largely 
espousing the thesis of the Club of 
Rome, as an argument against the 
further development of European inte-
gration. Yet, significantly, other Marxist 
authors have seen in the prospect of zero 
growth and a 'steady-state' economy, the 
opportunity for, indeed the inevitability 
of, the application of Socialist principles 
and the advent of centralized planning 
systems. 
The United Nations, albeit the one 
political forum where discussion of the 
global predicament could be expected, 
was slow to come systematically to grips 
with the intellectual challenge embodied 
in Limits to Growth Total insulation 
from it was impossible, particularly as 
the major elements of the 'problémati-
que' included in the formal model 
—food, population, environment— were 
separately under active consideration 
and high on the agenda of the Organiza-
tion. But no comprehensive programme 
was devised to sort out. check and 
analyse the major assumptions and 
results, so as to assist governments in 
defining their own position in a raging 
controversy. In the absence of any 
organized debate, the reactions observed 
were sporadic, random, intuitive and 
often angry. Motivations were suspect. 
Was the spectre of catastrophe raised by 
elitist groups in rich countries for the 
purpose of keeping under control the 
wave of aspirations and expectations 
which had hardly begun to be met? 
Although the report acknowledged the 
difficult circumstances of Third World 
development, its order of priorities and 
the arrangement of its various elements 
seemed wrong. The homogenized world, 
the uniform distribution of problems, 
which emerged as a result of the metho-
dology adopted, the lack of attention to 
conflictual situations, to the rich-poor 
dialectic which, in the United Nations, 
was viewed as the principal element 
of world dynamics -all this seemed 
somewhat unreal, and it should come 
as no surprise that the fundamental 
purpose was questioned. Since Malthus 
was frequently evoked, it was tempting 
to point out that the English parson had 
really evolved his famous theory (to 
which Limits to Growth superficially 
bore some resemblance) as a defence of 
the interests of the landed aristocracy of 
his time. 
Yet the United Nations too had its 
'scenario of the unacceptable', and had 
done so for quite some time. The Organi-
zation is not a newcomer to reflexion on 
the future. The need for long-term 
projections was felt as soon as the pro-
blem of newly independent developing 
countries became the focal point of its 
preoccupations. Quantification and 
long-term projections were recognized as 
necessary to the discharge of a collective 
responsibility. World models were in fact 
produced as from the 1950s.2 They were 
2
 In the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion, and in the Economic Commission for 
Latin America under Raúl Prebisch. 
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of a rather simple kind; however, they 
also used exponential curves, and at 
times, particularly with the assumption 
of a secular and inevitable deterioration 
of the terms of trade, they had 
something of the inexorable character 
which is found in the early Club of 
Rome approach. They centred on the 
calculation of two quantities crucial to 
development: the trade gap and the 
savings gap, which, when projected over 
the long term, revealed explosive situa-
tions, and the imperative need for 
concerted corrective action. 
The premises here were different 
from those used as the point of depar-
ture for Limits to Growth. They were 
concerned with goals, with aspirations 
towards a better and more just society, 
not with the prevention of hypothetical 
catastrophes. The diagnosis emphasized 
defects in social organization which 
could be corrected by political will and 
concerted international effort — not 
physical limits threatening the survival of 
the planet. The models postulated 
growth as the very foundation of 
progress, and technology as the principal 
engine of growth, a primarily benevolent 
factor whose ambivalent position has not 
yet been perceived. They also viewed the 
respect of national sovereignty as 
imperative and the search for national 
identity as a positive factor in the task of 
nation-building and the process of 
change. They did not subsume the early 
emergence of a high degree of world 
central management, the demise of 
national sovereignties and their dissolu-
tion into supranational, problem-solving 
institutions, which seemed implicit in 
the management of a 'stationary state'. 
The linkage between the growth of 
poor and rich countries was a corner-
stone of the whole edifice of co-
operation, and this must be kept in 
mind, as in the course of the 'Futures' 
debate it was often stated that the 
prescription of no-growth should apply 
only to the industrial countries which 
absorb such a disproportionate part of 
the world's resources and generate most 
of the pollution allegedly threatening 
human survival. Most developing 
countries are extraordinarily dependent 
on their exports to the industrial coun-
tries. It is a characteristic of their econ-
omies that they prosper or languish with 
the fortunes of the world markets, and it 
is easy to understand from the size of 
their import coefficients how vulnerable 
they would be to any drastic and durable 
reduction in the purchasing power of 
their rich partners. This would spell 
disasters far more readily visualized than 
the 'overshoot and collapse' processes 
described in Limits to Growth. In fact, 
the new vision of 'finiteness' does not 
easily fit into the conceptual framework 
for international relations as it has 
emerged from twenty-five years of 
United Nations deliberations, particu-
larly as the implications of zero growth 
or the feasibility of alternative forms of 
international intercourse have not as yet 
been thoroughly explored and convin-
cingly presented. 
The growth relationship may not be 
the most desirable arrangement for 
development co-operation and world 
harmony — even in the absence of 
physical limits- but one should not 
underestimate the difficulties of promot-
ing in the short run alternative models of 
interdependence. Within the existing 
growth relationship, the forms of correc-
tive action agreed upon as necessary 
could remain comparatively minimal. 
They were the least disturbing to exist-
ing patterns and structures. They mainly 
centred on capital transfers —a very mild 
form of voluntary taxation levied on the 
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industrial nations- and some relief from 
protectionism in regard to the natural 
resource exports of poor countries. And 
yet these relatively light obligations were 
consistently more honoured in the 
breach than the observance, thereby 
causing the 'growth relationship' to play 
an even greater role in the promotion of 
progress. These features have endured in 
the successive attempts at formulating 
global designs in the United Nations 
system and throughout the continuing 
frustrations caused by lack of imple-
mentation in despite of conceptual 
agreement. 
They are not, however, immutable. 
Indeed, current appraisals of the require-
ments of national consolidation more 
frequently highlight the priority objec-
tive of reducing —when necessary at the 
expense of growth— the extreme vulner-
ability of developing economies to the 
unsettling effects of external forces, 
resulting from the interplay of power 
positions on the markets. 
Notwithstanding a language deprived 
of specificity in the interests of political 
compromise, the New International 
Economic Order is cast in terms sugges-
tive of a more fundamental transforma-
tion than has been implicit in previous 
United Nations models, including the 
International Development Strategy. The 
emphasis is clearly on structural changes, 
on the redeployment of activities 
towards a substantially different division 
of labour. Growth relationship, trade 
policies and organized capital transfers 
are no longer viewed as sufficient for the 
desired changes. Some sort of more 
'affirmative action' seems implied, link-
ing national objectives and international 
co-operation in a different relationship. 
This new vision, reflecting as it does 
a global balance of power which had just 
been significantly altered by the strategy 
of the OPEC countries and their support 
of Third World general objectives, also 
acknowledges, ai least implicitly, some 
of the problems and constraints high-
lighted in the Club of Rome approach. 
The long-term perspective, if not very 
explicit, is inherent in a document which 
emphasizes a new geographic distribu-
tion of industrial activities; provision of 
adequate quantities of food and security 
of food supplies for a rapidly growing 
world population; avoidance of shortages 
in circumstances where the maturation 
of investments in natural resources as 
well as the lead time for the develop-
ment of new technologies appears to be 
lengthening; and the preservation of 
essential ecological balances in a situa-
tion where the rapid industrialization of 
large parts of the world remains an 
imperative need. A long-term perspective 
defined within successive time horizons 
appears essential to the pursuance of 
such objectives. It is also important to 
the process of negotiations through 
which the concerting of international 
action would emerge, as areas of mutual 
advantages or joint gains for all are more 
likely to be discovered within such a 
perspective. 
Five years and several world models 
after Limits to Growth, the sharp polar-
ity which initially appeared to place in 
opposition two 'scenarios of the unac-
ceptable' competing for the world's 
allegiance may be fading. The United 
Nations scenario, developed consistently 
over two decades, may not have had the 
instant dramatic impact of that produ-
ced by the first Club of Rome report. 
Yet it may prove the more durable, 
based as it is on compelling moral and 
political imperatives, rather than on 
controversial ecological hypotheses. It 
may also offer the more useful frame-
work for the continuation of the debate 
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on the global predicament, particu-
larly as the frightening time-span of 
the Meadows 'overshoot and collapse* 
recedes. Growth as an essential element 
in the management of social change 
seems to be making at least a qualified 
comeback from the assaults made on it 
by a vocal section of the Western intelli-
gentsia. The interest may now be shifting 
from 'limits' to alternative models of 
world order and patterns of national 
development Indeed the more recent 
reports sponsored by the Club of Rome 
deliberately focus on a New Order, and 
older ones are increasingly represented as 
contributions to the creation of a better 
society, rather than to the prevention of 
planetary disasters. Concurrently, the 
notion, ill-documented as it is, of a 
limited pool of resources finds its way 
into the rhetoric of the United Nations, 
either as an additional example of spolia-
tion of Third World interests, or as a 
promise of progress for producers of raw 
materials, 
2. The lack of an integrative theory 
One should not begrudge the part of 
eclecticism which may be at the source 
of such rapid changes of emphasis. They 
may rather be seen as one aspect of the 
quandary in which the international 
community (and for that matter the 'Fu-
tures Movement') finds itself currently 
trapped. In the search for a scheme of 
global rationality, we are severely handi-
capped by the lack of an integrative 
theory -or of rival integrative theories-
which would be accepted by wide sec-
tions of the intelligentsia and the centres 
of power, and which would explain the 
more significant aspects of the behaviour 
of society, provide a minimum capacity 
to predict, and afford a reliable basis for 
the formulation of rules and the develop-
ment of institutions. The erosion, or 
disintegration, of the major paradigms 
which had been used to elucidate as well 
as guide national development and inter-
national relations is an important factor 
of our present uncertainties. 
Firmly rooted in a substratum of 
values widely shared in the industrial so-
cieties, the theory of general competitive 
equilibrium offered a formalized struc-
ture for the development of a set of 
binding rules in the one area of inter-
national relations -the international 
exchange of goods and services- where 
regularities had once been observed and 
correlations identified. It had survived 
the emergence of new patterns of market 
behaviour, and made a place for oligopo-
listic practices as special cases -or aber-
rations- which did not generally destroy 
the validity of the paradigm. It also 
found support, and a much-needed new 
sophistication, in the approach of the 
'functionalist' school, which exhibited a 
very similar value system in its projec-
tion of the 'managerial society' and of 
the more novel aspects of the techno-
logical syndrome. It is still invoked in 
powerful circles, at least as a loose ortho-
doxy, accommodating an ever-increasing 
number of deviations, for fear of the 
vacuum which would be left by its final 
demise. 
The obsolescence of the theory is 
graphically illustrated in the widening 
range of practices developed in contra-
vention of the rules derived from it, and, 
if not fully legitimized, at least regarded 
with a great deal of tolerance. Barter 
arrangements between socialist and 
mark et-eco no m y countries have for 
some time been recognized as instru-
ments to expand rather than restrict 
trade: transactions between petroleum 
consuming and producing countries in 
which prices and conditions are kept 
purposely obscure may be viewed as 
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assisting a difficult process of adjustment 
to new conditions; dubious pricing prac-
tices in the transfer of goods between 
various units of a transnational enter-
prise with a single decision-making cen-
tre are condoned on the grounds of the 
assumed improvement in general welfare 
brought about by international produc-
tion; the proliferation of preferential 
agreements is justified in geopolitical 
terms, as a new centre of economic 
power emerges around the European 
Economic Community. 
But perhaps even more important 
than these empirical transgressions is the 
loss of confidence in earlier values with 
which the paradigm was identified. This 
is particularly significant in developing 
countries. In the face of compelling de-
mands for fundamental change, the value 
of trade as an instrument of improved 
domestic welfare, fuller employment and 
better income distribution is increasingly 
questioned. Even if it may have induced 
growth in one phase, it is subsequently 
found wanting, not only when adverse 
terms of trade persist over a long period, 
but even more surely when new policy 
objectives become paramount. Nor is the 
distrust of an open world economy con-
fined to Third World idiosyncracies. 
Europeans have -repeatedly during the 
recent recession— blamed the open inter-
national system for the frustration of 
their efforts to control the business 
cycle. Professor Harry Johnson once sug-
gested that certain 'political equations' 
are missing in the classical attitude to-
ward international trade. In the present 
state of our knowledge about social 
mechanisms, they are not easy to intro-
duce in a set of predictive hypotheses. 
Political factors were always present 
in the Marxist paradigm. For this reason 
its diagnosis often appeared more rele-
vant to situations of enduring inequali-
ties, more aware of latent conflicts and 
more attuned to the understanding of a 
process of transformation. However, this 
other major paradigm is also labouring 
today in the pangs of aggiomamento, 
notably in the efforts of a fraction of the 
'structuralist' school. It is not only that 
the evolution of societies as well as the 
more recent findings of sociology reveal 
a far more diversified social context, and 
a more complex set of causations, than 
those originally identified. More impor-
tant, regardless of its value as an analy-
tical tool, the paradigm when used as a 
guide to action is in danger of losing one 
of its inherent elements: the sense of 
historical sequences, which dictated that 
the right time and the appropriate set of 
circumstances must be discovered before 
radical action is undertaken. This was 
among the most lucid perceptions of 
Karl Marx. In political life, however, 
action is almost always a matter of 
urgency. It cannot be evaded, especially 
by the promoters of drastic transforma-
tions, irrespective of whether the time 
has come, or may have passed (for ins-
tance, if too many groups are linked to 
the political status quo through their 
present interests or their expectations). 
The outcome may then be a tragic back-
lash as the price paid for the misjudge-
ment. 
3. The 'voluntarist' approach 
The major paradigms may have re-
tained, and perhaps, in the case of 
Marxism, increased their following as an 
expression of general aspirations, or 
beliefs, but they have largely lost their 
capacity to explain, predict and guide. 
The resulting conceptual vacuum has 
not made it easier to take charge of 
those new assumptions of the ecological 
school which were integrated in neither 
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of the major paradigms. In such circum-
stances a good deal of philosophical free-
wheeling takes place: witness for 
instance the advocacy of 'triage', a 
notion resurrected from the most grue-
some experiences of World War II, as a 
logical strategy for dealing with impen-
ding food shortages; or the invocation of 
'neo-mercantilism' as a plausible princi-
ple for the management of the inter-
national economy. 
Such positions may be for the time 
being dismissed as marginal. But the 
public debate on the 'Future' encoun-
ters, on more serious grounds, real 
difficulties, which it has not yet efficient-
ly tackled. One of them is the role 
which 'value systems' come to play as a 
central parameter in the search for solu-
tions to such problems as the possible 
exhaustion of resources or the threat of 
asphyxiation through pollution. A dras-
tic change in ethical values is often as-
sumed to be not only more desirable, 
but more easily achieved than techno-
logical innovations or adaptations. Yet 
not much attention is given to the social 
determinants of value systems, their 
built-in inertia, and the conditions under 
which they evolve. It is disturbing when 
new Weltanschauungen, accompanied 
by the inevitable 'manifestos', appear to 
spring up at the drop of a computer 
print-out Nevertheless, this too is a 
manifestation of a widespread anxiety 
and revolt, and they are not unrelated to 
the ontological need for a reliable para-
digm. In the absence of an integrative 
theory, there is naturally a temptation to 
advocate strategies developed mainly, if 
not exclusively, from moral imperatives. 
They are bound to be fragile. The im-
morality of present arrangements (if that 
is the word) of international intercourse 
is patent enough when it can be said that 
even the worst extravagance and waste in 
the rich countries have some beneficial 
effect on the situation of the poor, or 
perhaps more accurately, that the sud-
den interruption of these habits would 
play havoc with many situations which 
one would want to protect. But the 
correction of these anomalies requires 
more than the intuitive espousal of new 
rules of behaviour. One suspects that an 
ethic of frugality and conservation 
would find its rightful place in a scheme 
of global rationality. But it is in the 
nature of complex social systems that 
they are 'counter-intuitive' (to use the 
phrase of Jay W. Forrestor) until the 
implications of particular courses of 
action have been fully elucidated. Fruga-
lity and conservation may have wide-
spread unintended effects on employ-
ment, investment, income and wealth 
distribution. 
Given the present stage of our under-
standing of economic and social beha-
viour, a formalized integrative theory of 
national development and international 
relations is not likely to emerge very 
soon. It might even be imprudent to 
attempt it before the work of empirical 
investigation has progressed farther. This 
would suggest that for the time being the 
search for a scheme of global rationality 
can proceed only along a path which 
French authors describe as 'voluntarist', 
without the control and guidance which 
come from empirically tested hypothe-
ses. In international relations, the broad 
consensus which must at all times be 
sought may be an insurance against 
expediency and arbitrary judgement, or 
the worship of false gods. 
Indeed, global designs and plans of 
action developed in the United Nations 
are a first approximation to what can be 
achieved through a 'voluntarist' approach, 
combining moral and political imperatives 
with a good measure of empirical econo-
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mic analysis. They also exemplify the 
limits of the approach. It is very conge-
nial to the broad definition of ends, but 
often leaves us somewhat at a loss in 
regard to the means. Nor is it always 
successful in clarifying the conditions of 
consistency between different objectives 
specified. The existence of multiple 
objectives, even in the most primitive 
societies, is a characteristic of the 
contemporary world. The difficulties 
deriving from this factor cannot be 
eluded in the further development of 
global designs. Growth will never again, 
either in the developing or in the indus-
trial world, stand as the sole specified 
objective, on the assumption that its 
achievement would automatically pro-
duce dividends in the areas of social wel-
fare, equity or the quality of life. A 
serious effort must now be made to 
clarify trade-offs, options and inconsis-
tencies. Bridging the welfare gap within 
nations will not, by itself, help in redu-
cing the income gap between nations. 
Action oriented toward either of these 
goals does not necessarily coincide with 
a strategy of meeting minimum needs in 
the shortest possible span of time. Fore-
casting slower growth in the rich coun-
tries as a result of the natural maturation 
of their economies, or of policies re-
quired to control inflation or protect the 
environment, is one thing. But adopting 
deliberate policies of deceleration, as 
sometimes recommended, for the pur-
pose of reducing international inequali-
ties, is another matter, and may very 
well impair the fulfilment of the more 
immediate objectives of developing 
countries. Stabilizing, or valorizing, pri-
mary commodity prices may have world-
wide distributional effects that run 
counter to one or more of the general 
goals. Specific targets, supposedly esta-
blished as steps towards the attainment 
of the general goals in question —for 
instance, industrialization and food suffi-
ciency targets— may find themselves in 
conflict with other investment policies 
pursued in the name of the same broad 
objectives. 
Conflicts between objectives may be 
more manageable, and acceptable trade-
offs or reconciliations more readily dis-
covered, if successive time periods are 
explored. But other difficulties may arise 
when the political implications inherent 
in certain economic models are clearly 
specified and viewed in a perspective of 
long-term change. Institutional arrange-
ments and forms of collective discipline, 
which are accepted under the pressure of 
necessity, may appear oppressive once 
the worst features of mass poverty have 
been eradicated. And yet a political 
apparatus may have been established 
which will tend to be self-perpetuating, 
even though it will become obsolete or 
undesirable once a new phase in the 
development process brings with it a new 
and different set of goals and aspirations. 
In trying to sort out the interrela-
tionships of goals and objectives we 
should also seek to learn more about the 
true aspirations of societies of different 
cultures. Too often statements on goals 
and aspirations express what a French 
economist3 aptly calls 'vicarious desires', 
or the imputation to others of the 
author's own preferences. Moreover, the 
techniques of enquiry on this delicate 
subject often fail to pinpoint the dilem-
mas inevitably confronting civilizations 
in process of transformation, or of ade-
quately clarifying the foreseeable conse-
quences of different options, including 
their negative aspects and side-effects. 
Only when accurately-described alterna-
tives are presented can goals and aspira-
3
 Serge Christophe Kolm. 
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tions be expressed in terms which may 
have an operational meaning. 
The risks and pitfalls of 'voluntarism' 
call for a systematic effort to acquire a 
better empirical knowledge of the rela-
tions between political, social, and to an 
increasing extent, ecological factors. 
Even while we have relegated Adam 
Smith's 'Invisible Hand' to a more 
modest position in our intellectual uni-
verse, we suspect that there are in all 
social systems mechanisms of 'resilience', 
instrumental in adapting to fast-changing 
circumstances, absorbing shocks and dis-
continuities, and managing crises. Because 
we have a simplistic view of economic 
behaviour, we tend to drift toward self-
defeating solutions of bureaucratic cen-
tralism where the encouragement of 
popular and local initiatives would be 
appropriate. 
The success of the 'voluntarist' 
approach, as well as the progress of an 
'integrative theory', may hinge upon the 
improvement of knowledge in regard to 
individual and group motivations. Thus a 
broadening of the economic discipline is 
required, to extend it beyond the succes-
sive refinements of the models which 
have dominated the last hundred years, 
perhaps even beyond what used to be 
called 'political economy', which is 
already enjoying a kind of revival. It is 
significant that some economists are 
exploring 'games theory' to analyse 
examples of coalition, and other types of 
relations between different actors in the 
market, and that others are invading 
-with considerable gusto- the field of 
psychosociology. 
From time to time powerful and illu-
minating watchwords may assist our 
understanding of the forces at work. Not 
only are they symbols of deep-seated 
aspirations, but they may also suggest a 
methodology for the investigation of the 
means to fulfil their promise. Self-
reliance today plays a pivotal role. It 
may cover a wide spectrum of scenarios 
of national development and their articu-
lation with alternative views of world 
order. It may apply to models of accele-
rated industrialization taking maximum 
advantage of international trade and 
financial flows within an open and widen-
ing world market, or to a socialist 
pattern of organization, implying a signi-
ficant degree of insulation from the 
external world and deliberate policies of 
'de-linking' South from North. But it 
also suggests the will, common to all 
developing countries, to enhance and 
consolidate nationhood, to mitigate the 
impact of external circumstances and to 
develop the capacity and the instruments 
for autonomous decision-making. Be-
cause of this strong common denominator 
as well as because of the diversity of its 
application, self-reliance (with its 'exten-
sion' into Third World collective self-
reliance) must be seen as a central 
concept in the 'voluntarist' approach to 
the restructuring of the world economy 
and the redefinition of the rules of the 
game. It cannot be locked into a purely 
economic interpretation. Long-term plans 
for restructuring international economic 
relations and redeploying industrial and 
other activities should take into account 
the political imperatives of self-reliance in 
Third World countries. 
4. Improving the institutional frame-
work 
In a framework of theoretical uncer-
tainties and acknowledged deviations 
from rules, one would hope for inter-
national institutions of a quasi-judiciary 
nature capable of investigating, inter-
preting and adjudicating. These may 
appear at some stage. In the meantime 
the United Nations institutional system, 
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which the international community has 
evolved over a period of 30 years, should 
be appreciated at its full value. The 
opportunities offered by its ubiquitous 
and continuous debate to sort out com-
plex issues within a political context; its 
machinery for information and analysis; 
the redeeming influence of its 'adversary 
procedures and processes' (too often 
condemned as sterile confrontational 
tactics) in the search for a consensus; 
-all these are significant assets in the 
advancement of a New International 
Economic Order. 
New analytical tools have become 
available which are useful and instrumen-
tal in the furtherance of our cognitive 
process, and in the improvement of plan-
ning. Computerized models have cap-
tured a lion's share of the attention of the 
'Futures Movement'. They have a unique 
educational value. Their capacity to 
assemble and organize a formidable volu-
me of information enables them to offer 
a useful representation of the inter-
dependence of problems and of situa-
tions in complex systems, at least to the 
extent that measurable factors are in-
volved. And the exploration of alternative 
'scenarios' opens the door to the intro-
duction of a variety of hypotheses, some 
of which may be adequately related to 
political action. Their ambitious com-
plexity, which is sometimes viewed as 
the touchstone of their validity, may 
also be precisely their weakness, as the 
manipulation of so many parameters 
would seem to require a more solid data 
base than is at present available. In a way 
global model-making seems to have be-
come indispensable before becoming entire-
ly reliable, and its use for forecasting 
purposes or policy assessments, although 
not negligible, is still limited. Authors 
are generally very straightforward in re-
cognizing this, but the media are less 
cautious and often project a misleading 
picture. 
Because we are unable at this stage 
to construct a paradigm of global trans-
formation, we should not give up the 
more limited objective of working out 
more specific theoretical frameworks, 
much needed to handle correctly the 
large quantities of empirical data which 
are already available or could be collec-
ted. This would assist decision-making in 
areas where any action must be pon-
dered in a perspective of some duration: 
resources scarcities and substitutabilities, 
technology changes and technological 
choices, shifting patterns of consump-
tion and their worldwide consequences. 
Such theoretical frameworks would also 
serve as building-blocks for the wider 
conceptualization. 
It is particularly intriguing that as 
the debate on the 'Future' shifts from 
'catastrophe' to 'a new society' —to use 
the words of the Bariloche report— the 
notion of physical limits seems to have 
been somewhat lost sight of, or diluted 
into the ethical and still ambiguous cate-
gory of frugality. Yet the constraints 
dramatically presented in Limits to 
Growth should be taken very seriously. 
Both in the field of resources investment 
and in that of environment protection, 
they seem to be already influencing, 
marginally at least, public policies and 
investment decisions. 'Finiteness' is 
perhaps not a useful organizing principle 
in discussion on the predicament of man-
kind; the debate should focus rather on 
social and political change. But it cannot 
leave out the ecological factors which 
have only recently come to light and 
require thorough investigation. 
The constraints are real in terms of 
cost, time and technologies, and the 
stakes are high. Most prominently, a 
smooth transition to a new energy 
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economy must be prepared; global or 
local shortages, even temporary ones, 
must be avoided, and a better distribu-
tion of the sources of energy production 
must be achieved to lighten the balance-
of-payment difficulties of a great many 
countries and reduce their dependency 
on a few centres. Some incipient form of 
global management is called for in this 
field, at least in the form of systematic 
monitoring and information which 
would assist in appraising potential sup-
plies, reserves and resources, and the 
state of the art in technological develop-
ment. The true alternatives must be 
made apparent They have been ob-
scured for 25 years by an undue concentra-
tion of research and development on the 
nuclear option, on the basis of assump-
tions relative to costs and safety which 
are now being increasingly challenged. 
The international community and many 
national entities are visibly striving to 
limit the proliferation of nuclear facilities, 
even if a large part of the programmes 
which are now at different stages of 
planning and implementation cannot be 
cancelled. Yet present institutional 
arrangements governing research and 
development appear inadequate for the 
management of a difficult transition to 
new energy sources. During a Confe-
rence4 held in the summer of 1976, on 
the Future Supply of Nature-Made 
Petroleum and Gas, these inadequacies 
were amply demonstrated. It became 
clear that engineers and scientists 
working in the disciplines related to 
4
 The Conference on The Future Supply of 
Nature-Made Petroleum and Gas, jointly organi-
zed by the United Nations Institute for 
Training and Research (UNITAR) and the 
International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA), was held in Laxenburg (Aus-
tria), 5-16 July 1976. 
some 20 new types of petroleum and gas 
resources had hardly any contact with 
one another, even within the confines of 
their own countries, let alone inter-
nationally. Legislation to prevent collu-
sion, and the desire to protect the confi-
dentiality of research efforts, condition 
the behaviour of public as well as private 
entities. This inevitably results in a 
costly multiplication of large expenditures 
(at a time when adequate funds for re-
search and development are not assured), 
and undue delays in the perfection 
of new technologies and processes. A 
change in the existing rules or practices 
in the direction of a different mix of 
co-operation and competition seems re-
quired, as the situation, even to the true 
believers in the 'technology fix', is not 
altogether reassuring. Research and deve-
lopment should also assume a truly inter-
national dimension, as the countries 
which are best equipped with technical 
and financial means to develop useful 
technologies and new types of resources 
are not necessarily those which are in the 
most urgent need of them. 
Although anxieties about resources 
depletion have recently occupied the 
front of the stage, concern about the 
environment was probably more instru-
mental in the early development of the 
idea of 'limits'. After the awakening of 
the last ten years, and the impulse of the 
1972 Stockholm Conference on Environ-
ment, understanding of the interactions 
between environment and development 
has not proceeded at such a pace as to 
enable a methodology to emerge that 
could offer policy-makers useful guidan-
ce. The consensus in this difficult area 
has not widened as might have been 
hoped. In most cases it still emerges as 
the outcome of a contest between diffe-
rent pressure groups. It is true that, as a 
result of numerous studies and of the 
20 CEPAL REVIEW / First half of 1977 
experience acquired in the promotion of 
practical measures and policies, a certain 
confidence has been gained that the,envi-
ronment factor can be brought within 
manageable dimensions and need not 
upset the general equilibrium of develop-
ment policies embodied in United Nations 
legislation, notwithstanding the drastic 
revisions and policy changes required in 
some areas. Such confidence may be justi-
fied in respect of the vast field where 
environment problems revolve around 
choices and trade-offs between various 
types of amenities and disamenities, and 
where the problem is one of evolving a 
more rational decision-making process. 
Yet it is in the field of environment 
that some of the major and most intrac-
table uncertainties, entailing grave risks, 
would continue to plague decision-makers: 
climate modification, genetic engineering, 
the nuclear syndrome. The test of states-
manship is here particularly exacting, as 
uncertainties are not going to yield to a 
Socratic dialogue, and international agree-
ments would have to be sought on policies 
of restraint (the 'prudential' approach) 
which would not be based on the rational-
ity imparted by scientific knowledge. 
This in turn might be more easily 
accepted, and the anxieties pertaining to 
such situations might be alleviated, if the 
need to subject the development of new 
technology to some form of social con-
trol were to begin to be recognized. 
In the dramatic unfolding of the 
controversy over 'ultimate limits', tech-
nology has figured at times as the Deus, 
at times as the Diabolus ex machina. But 
it is within the power of mature societies 
to subordinate it to fundamental social 
requirements. An example was recently 
set by the scientific community in the 
field of genetic engineering, when, for 
the first time, a decision was made that 
experimentation should be subject to a 
measure of self-policing. Further expe-
rience with technology forecasting and 
technology assessment, which have 
hardly as yet taken root in governmental 
and international institutions, will almost 
inevitably lead to similar approaches and 
to the recognition that some restrictions 
may have to be placed on the right of man 
to expand the frontiers of knowledge. 
Such a notion is today still new and some-
what forbidding. Tomorrow it could lead 
to the guidance of research and develop-
ment toward a different hierarchy of 
objectives, one based on internationally 
and democratically agreed criteria of 
human needs. 
